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Abstract
The Shapley value is shown to be a von Neumann-Morgenstern ut
function. The concept of strategic risk is introduced, and it is
that the Shapley value of a game equals its utility if and only ±i
underlying preferences are neutral to both ordinary and strategic

1 • I ti troduc t io
n
The development of game theory has been closely associated with
the axiomatx : treatment of cardinal 5tilities, ever since both were
introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern. In Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior they give a set of axioms which assure that a
cardinal utility function can be deduced from ordinal preferences.
This cardinal utility is than used to define the characteristic func-
tion form of a game.
In 1953, in his classic paper 'A Value For n-Person Games', L.S.
5hapley notes that this cardinal utility is defined only for 'simple
situations'
—
prizes, and lotteries over prizes—but not for games them-
selves. He says:
"At the foundation of the theory of games is the assump-
tion that the players of a game can evaluate, in their utility
scales, every "prospect" that might arise as a result of a
play. In attempting to apply the theory to any field, one
iould normally expect to be permitted to include, in the class
of "prospects," the prospect ot having to play a v^ame. The
possibility of evaluating games is therefore of critical im-
portance. So long as the theory is unable to assign values
•;o the games typically found in application, only relatively
simple situations — where games do not depend on other games —
will be susceptible to analysis and solution,"
He proceeds co give three cardinal conditions which a value for
Simes 3hculd satisfy, and to show that there is a unique function which
satisfies these conditions.

In this paper, we develop a cardinal utility function for games,
based on ordinal preferences. Our treatment shall differ from the
elementary a Somatization of utiliti s from preference: in that games—
the objects over which our preferences are defined—are themselves
defined in terms of a cardinal utility.
Thus it shall be necessary to insure that the utility function for
game? is compatible with the existing utility function which defines
the games. We shall show that this requirement leads to a unique utility
function for games, and that, when the underlying preference relation is
neutral with respect to certain kinds of risk, the utility of a game is
equal to the Shapley value.
2* Utility Theory
We summarize here an axiomatization of utility presented in [1]
.
A set K is a mixture set if for any elements a,beM, and for any
number p G [0,1], we can associate another element of M denoted by
[pa;(l-p)b] called a lottery between a and b. (Henceforth the letters
p and q will be reserved for elements of [0,1].) . We assume that lot-
teries have the following properties for all a.bsM:
[la;0b] - a, [pa;(l-p)b] - [(l-p)b;pa], and
(2.1) !>[pa;U-p)b];(i-q)b] - [pqa; (l-pq)b]
A preference on K is defined to be a binary relation £ such that
for any a.beM either a > b or b -£ a must hold, and if a 2 b and b ^ c
then a > c. (We write a> b if a £ b and b ^ a, and a ~ b if a ^ b
and b ^ a.) A real valued function u defined on a mixture set M is a
utility function for the preference %* if it is order preserving (i.e.

if ¥a»beM, u(a) > u(h) if and only if a >• b) , and if
2) u([pa;(l-p)b]) « pu(a) + (l-p)u(b).
If &* ±3 a preference ordering on a mixture set M, then the follow-
ing conditions insure that a utility function exists:
(2.3) For any a,b,ceM, the set?, (pi [pa; (l~p)b] ^ c} and
{pjc^ '
:
^ai(I"p)1>]} are closed; and
j(2.4) If a,a'eM and a ~ a
1 then for any beM, fea;^b] ~ [%a';^b].
The utility function is unique up to an affine transformation. For
any clement xeM, the utility of x can be given by
,,/„<> ^ Eabi^l—'UEsbilalU(
' Pab<*i> ~ Pab<*0>
where a,b»r-, and r. are elements of M such that a > x ^ b and
air r.« ^ t,>, h, and for any ycM such that a£ y >> b, pab(v) is defined
by
(2.5) V - l?ab(y)^>' 1 "Pab (y);)b5 '
It can be shown that the numbers P3b (*) are well defined,
and the
function i\ independent of the choice of a and b. The fixed
elements r and r
fv
determine the origin and scale of the utility func-
tion; not a that u(r-) *-> and u ^r
cP
™ °*
3- The Snap ley Value
We summarize here the axiomatization of the value presented in
[2], giving first some necessary definitions.

4Denote by N the universal set of players (or positions) , and de-
fine a game to be any function v from the subsets of 8
to the real
numbers such that for all sets S.Tc N,
v(S) > v(SftT) + v(S-T) and v(0) - 0,
where denotes the empty set.
The quantity v(S) can be interpreted as the utility obtainable
by the
coalition S.
For convenience we shall assume that N is a finite set, and
denote
its cardinality by n. (Similarly, the cardinality of sets R, S,
and T
will be denoted r, s, and t.)
A carrier of v is any set TSN such that for all S £ N
v(S) - v(T S).
The superset of any carrier is itself a carrier. If n is a
permutation
of N(ie. if tt is a one to one mapping from N to itself) then,
for all
sets S <E N, we denote the image of S under it by ir S, and
define the game
tt v by
irv(TfS) - v(S>.
By the value of a game v we mean a vector valued function
0(v) - (0 (v), (v)"-0 (v)) which associates a real number t (v) with
each position ieK, and which obeys the following conditions.
(3.1) For each permutation tt, fl^Cirv) - ± (v).
(3.2) For each carrier T of v, £ ± (v)
- v(T)
.
ieT
(3.3) For any games v and w, 0(v+w) - 0(v) + 0(v)
.

Note that (3.3) implies that if (v-w) , v, and w are all games, then
0(v-w) = 0(v) - 0(w).
Conditions (3.1) and (3.2) are sufficient to show that for games
of the form v defined for any R,S£ N by
R
V
R
(S) = £o if R *5
i S
s
and for any non-negative number c, the value must be
/"j n rt / % W r if i e R(3.4) »
t
(cv,
l
) =^ Q ±f ,At
It can also be shown that any game v can be written as a linei
combination of games of the form vp :
v = I ct>Cv)v
RSN R R
where the coefficients c
r>
(v) are given by
cp (v) = Z (-D^SrCT).R
TSR
Condition (3«3) can now be used to demonstrate the remarkable
result that the unique function satisfying conditions (3.1), (3.2). and
(3.3) and defined on all games is given by
(v) . z (
(3-l)?U-s,)!
) ws)-v(s-l)) .
S£N
4. A Utility Function for Games
For simplicity of presentation we will henceforth confine our
attention to the class Z of games which are positive valued > i.e. games

1for which v(S) > for all S£N. A position i e N is called a dummy
for a game v if it is not contained in every carrier. Denote by
D <= Z the class of games for which i is a dummy.
It will be convenient to identify the games vQ
and v
±
given for
all S S N by
fl if i e S
v
Q
(S) - 0; and v
±
(S) « £ if iXs>
In the game v , all positions are dummies; in v±
all positions but i
are dummies
.
We will be interested in the mixture set H generated by the set
Z*"N of strategic po sitions . Thus M consists of all lotteries of the
form [p(v,i);(l-p)(w,j)L where (v,i) and (w,j) are elements of Ml.
We assume that a preference relation £ is defined on M which satisfies
(2.3) and (2.4). (Read (v,i)^ (w,j) as 'It is preferred to play
position i in game v than to play position j in game wV )
The games in the class Z are all defined in terms of some observer's
(fixed) utility function u for 'sit le situations'. The preference
relation over the set M is assumed to be] o the same observer. In
order to make this notion consistent, tpose the following restrictions
on the preferences.
(4.1) For all i £ N, v £ Z and for any permutation 7T, (v,i) ~ (irv,iri)
(4.2) If v £ D. then (v,i) ~ (vQ ,i),
and for every v £ Z and i £ N,
(v,i)<5 (vQ ,i)
and (v
±
,i) > (vQ
,i).
(4.3) "For any number c > 1, and for every v £ Z s i £ N,
(v,i) - [|(cv,i);(l-^)(v ,i)l.
"We that this differs slightly from the usual definition of a dummy

7Condition (4.1) merely says that the. names of the positions do
not determine CheiK desirability in a game. Condition (4.2) say:< elicit:
playing any position in any game (in the class Z) is at least as desir-
able as being a dummy in any game, and chat there is some strategic
position, namely (v. ,i) s which is strictly preferable to being a dummy.
Condition (A. 3) takes note of the fact that games are defined in
terms of a utility function. It says that if two strategic positions
are identical except for the fact that the utility obtainable in one is
a positive multiple of the utility obtainable in the other, then t
first is indifferent to the appropriate gamble between the second, and
the prospect of receiving zero. This is virtually the definition of
utility, as given by equation (2.2).
We are now in a position to define a utility function for strateg
position, which we shall call strategic utility to distinguish it from
the utility function u used to define the games. Such a function ex^st;:,
since the preference ;b satisfies (2.3) and (2,4) by assumption.
Tne strategic utility of a game v is the vector
0(v) - 0,(v), 6L(v),...0 (v vj), where
i l n
e
±
(v) 5 0<v,i) = Pa1><(v,D) - Pao(^Q)
Pab<rl) - Pab< r0>
for probabilities Pab(') as *n (2.5) and for a,b s r 1 , r e M such that
a^ (v, i)-^b, and a ^ r_ > l. '%- b. Fixing r- = (v. »i) and r_ (v^,i)
i U X 1 U <j
we get (v.) 1 and 8. (v
f>
) - 0, Condition (4.2) insures that we
always take b ~ r^, so that Pab(r«) = for all a £ M.

We can also prove the following lemma
Lemma JL: For any permutation TT, and for every i e N,
.
(rrv) - 8
Proof: Immediate from the order preserving properties of utility
functions, and from condit .)
.
/
Lemma
_2: For r c '2 0, and for eny i £ K,
e.(cv) - c9. (v).
Proof : Without loss of generality, take c > 1.
Case I; (cv,i) X r, = (v.,i).
•
—
"^ ± i
Take a - (cv,i) and b = r « (v-.i). Then G,(cv) =
„ Pab ((cv,i>) m 3
Pab( r i> Pab<r]/
(v,i) ~ [- (cv,i);(l--) r ], so pab ((v,i)) «- . Consequently
e (v) . Pab((v,D) . I e (cv) .
i ;; c c i
Case II: Let. r, - (v. ,i) X (cv,i) . Take a^r., , b=r r> . Then pa,(r, ) = 1,
and so B
±
(cv) - pab (cv,i). But (v,i)~[—(cv,i) ; (1- —)rQ ]~[-[pab ((cv,i))a;
(i-p^ v ((cv,i))b] ;(1- —)b] by definition of p , («)• But by condition
ar> c ab
(2.1), this, is equal to [--p ( (cv,i))a; (1- ^p ((cv,i))b]. So
c ao c ao
e
i
(v) = Pab ((v - 1);' =W (CV >-1)) -£et <CT>-
Our procedure so far has been, in effect, to imbed the set of simple
prospects in the mixture space of games. Any simple prospect whose utilitj
u is equal to some value c > can be identified with the game cv. , since
(4.4) 0.(cv.) - c.
1 1

This follows from Lemma 2 and the fact, that G.(v J > = 1 and 0. (v_) = 0.I i 1
By Lemma 1, any position i yields the same result.
Condition (4.4) says that the strategic utility is simply an
extension of the utility function a which defines the games. The
utility function is unique (for a fixed u) , since condition (4.4)
sets the origin and scale.
In order to evaluate for other elements of the set M (i.e. for
games not of the form cv ) we must investigate the risk posture of the
preference relation ^ .
5. Risk Posture
We shall distinguish between two kinds of risk. Ordinary risk in-
volves the uncertainty which arises from the chance mechanism involved
in lotteries, while strategic risk involves the uncertainty which arises
from the interaction in a game of the strategic players (i.e. those who
are not dummies)
.
The preference ^ is averse to strategic risk if for every R ? N and
all i e R, (v.,i) X (rv_,i), where v_ is defined as in section 3. This
1 K K
means that it is preferable to receive a utility of i for certain (in a
game with no other strategic players) than, to negotiate how to distri-
bute a utility of r among r players.
If the preference is reversed, we say it is risk preferring to
strategic risk. The. preference relation tl is neutral to strategic risk
if for all R ? N, and every i e R,
(5.1) (v.,i) - (rv
R
,i).
The preference ^ is averse to ordinary risk if for all i £ N, and
v,w e Z, ((pv-r(l-p)v) ,i) > [p(w,i) ;(l-p) (v,i)} i.e. if it is preferable

10
to play the game (pw + (i-p)v) than to have a lottery which results
in
the game w with probability p and the game v with probability (1-p)
.
Similarly, the preference is neutral to ordinary risk if for all
games v, w £ 2, and for every i £ ft
(5.2) ((pw+(l-p)v),i) ~ [p(w,i);(l-p)(v,i)}.
We can now prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 3 : If the preference relation >> is neutral to strategic
risk, then
\~ for i e R
1 K (0 for i\R.
Proof : If i\R, then ±(vR) = by (4,2) and the fact that
v
R £
D
±
.
If i £ R, then 0, (v_) - ~ by (5.1) and Lemma 2.
L K r
Lemma 4 : If the preference relation £ is neutral to ordinary risk,
then
0(v+w) - 0(v) + 0(w).
Proof: For each i £ N, 0. (v4w) « b, ( 2 Gflr+J»r) ) - 2 (V+W
x i. •»-
by Lemma 2. But ©.(V+V) - *2 \M + ^ 6± (w) by (5.2) and (2.2), so
0.(v+w) = 0.(v) + (w).
Thus for a preference relation^ which has the properties (2.3), (2.4),
(4.1), (4.3), we can prove the. following:
Theorem : The strategic utility is equal to the Shapley value
if
and only if the preference relation £ is neutral with re-
spect to both ordinary and strategic risk.
Proof: Bv (3.5) and Lemmas 2 and 4, 9(v) - Z c (v)0(v ) , where the num-
rcn
bers cR(v) are
given by (3.6). But 0.(vR) - 0.(vR)
by Lemma 3 and (3.4).
So 0.(v) - S cn (v) 0,(0 - 0. (v).
RCN
R X R *
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6. Discussion
We have shown that the Shapley value is a risk neutral
utility
function. This fact sheds some lighc on the axioms which
define the
value, particularly axioms (3.2) and (3.3). Lemmas 3 and
A make it
clear that these two axioms are intimately related to the
two kinds
of risk neutrality.
Perhaps it will also serve to illuminate some of the properties
of the value. For instance, the relationship between the
value and
the competitive allocations of a market game might be better
under-
stood if conditions could be determined under which preferences
tend
towards risk neutrality as the competitiveness of the market
increases.
It may also prove fruitful to investigate strategic utility
func-
tions arising from preferences which are net risk neutral.
In partic-
ular, the concept of strategic risk seems likely to yield
interesting
results in this regard.
A simple case involves a linear posture to strategic risk,
given
by
(6.1 (kv ,i) ~ (rvR,i),
where k is a non-negative number. Risk neutrality is just the special
case k - 1; the preference is risk, averse if k < 1, and
risk preferring
if k > 1. If is the strategic utility which reflects
condition
(6.1) , then t v
f - for i e R
1 K / for i e R
and consequently, for an arbitrary game v, e± (v)
- k0
±
(v).
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More formally, for preferences which obey
conditions (2,3), (2.4),
(4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), we have the
following generalization of the
main theorei .
Proposition : If the preference is neutral to
ordinary risk, and
linear (with coefficient k) to strategic risk,
then
e.(v) - k0.(v).
i i
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